A striking observation of the U.S. and other labor markets is the weak position of women in terms of job attachment, employment, and earnings relative to men. We develop a model of fertility and labor market decisions to study the impact of fertility on gender differences in labor turnover, employment, and wages. In our framework, individuals search for jobs and accumulate general (experience) and specific (tenure) human capital when they work. They can also increase their wage by moving to a job of higher quality. Labor market decisions (e.g. job acceptance and job mobility) may differ across genders: females that give birth may decide to interrupt their labor market attachment in order to enjoy the value of staying at home with their children. The model economy is successfully calibrated to match aggregate statistics in terms of fertility, employment, and wages. We find that fertility decisions generate important gender differences in turnover rates, with long lasting effects in employment and wages. These differences in labor turnover account for almost all the U.S. gender wage gap that is attributed to labor market experience by Blau and Kahn (2000) . The model also implies a very small role of tenure capital in accounting for wage differences between males and females (gender gap), and between females with and without children (family gap). † We would like to specially thank Richard Rogerson and an anonymous referee for very detailed and valuable comments. We have also benefited from the comments of the editor (Raquel Fernández), Ig Horstmann, Angelo Melino, and Aloysius Siow. All remaining errors are our own.
Introduction
A well known feature of the U.S. and other labor markets is the sharp distinction in women and men's position in terms of job attachment, employment, and earnings. For instance, in average, women in the U.S. earn about 30% less than males (Blau and Khan, 2000) , have a 19% lower employment ratio (OECD, 1998) , are 20% less likely to transit to a better job and 19% more likely to go into non-employment (Royalty, 1998) . Substantial amount of research has been devoted to the understanding of women's conditions in the labor market, the role of child bearing and rearing in these outcomes, and the study of policies targeted at equalizing their opportunities. Yet, the exact mechanism by which fertility and women's labor market turnover affect future employment and wages is not clearly understood. Empirical studies are faced with problems associated with the endogeneity of fertility decisions, labor market experience, and job tenure. The objective of this paper is to provide a framework to study the interactions of fertility and labor market turnover in the determination of employment and wages. We argue that this is a necessary and important step for the evaluation of family policies.
There is substantial evidence that women's attachment to the labor market is closely related with fertility decisions. Phipps, Burton, and Lethbridge (2001) document that, in average, women have substantially more job interruptions and of longer duration than males, with 80% of these interruptions being related to maternity, while only 1% of male's interruptions being related to family. In fact, the employment rate is substantially lower for mothers with infants than for young females (45% versus 66%, see Klerman and Leibowitz, 1994) . A significant body of empirical research finds that past decisions about labor market participation affect women's current wages and employment (see, for instance, Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989; and Altug and Miller, 1998) . Moreover, there is a strong negative relationship between wages of women and the number of children in the household (Fuchs, 1989) .
We develop a model of fertility and labor market decisions to study the impact of fertility on gender differences in labor turnover, employment, and wages. In our framework, workers search for jobs and face job to non-employment and job to job transitions. The probability of these transitions depend on experience and tenure on the job as documented in the empirical literature (Topel and Ward, 1992; Farber, 1994) . Labor productivity evolves stochastically depending on individuals' decisions. When individuals work, they may accumulate specific (tenure) and general (experience) human capital, according to the estimates provided by Topel (1991) for the U.S. economy. When they separate from their jobs, all specific human capital is lost but general human capital remains constant. In addition, jobs differ in quality.
Workers can improve the quality of their jobs if they decide to change jobs when faced with an opportunity to do so. In this way the model economy captures an important feature of the U.S. labor market: job to job transitions are quite frequent for young workers and are associated with substantial wage growth (Topel and Ward, 1992 ).
The stochastic processes for human capital accumulation and for labor market turnover are assumed to be the same across genders. Labor market decisions (e.g. job acceptance and job mobility) may differ across genders: females that give birth may decide to interrupt their labor market attachment in order to enjoy the value of staying at home with their children.
This value is drawn, each period, from a probability distribution. Depending on the draws obtained over time, females may stay out of the labor force for more than one period.
Consequently, they not only loose all tenure capital when (voluntary) interrupting their career, but also may not accumulate human capital (general and specific) and improve their job quality for many periods. Fertility decisions can thus generate important gender wage differences. Moreover, because in our benchmark economy turnover probabilities depend on experience and tenure, job separations due to fertility decisions affect future labor market turnover and can have long lasting effects on female's employment. In particular, since the (exogenous) probabilities of moving into non-employment are highest at low levels of tenure, a job separation today increases the likelihood of a job separation in the subsequent job. This, in turn, implies a lower chance of accumulating human capital and of changing jobs (e.g. improving job quality). If career interruptions lead females to accumulate less tenure and quality of jobs than males with the same experience, then the model economy can generate gender wage differences above and beyond the differences accounted for by experience. This could be important because there is evidence of sizable gender wage disparities even after considering actual differences in experience (see, for instance, Kahn, 1997, 2000) .
A summary of our results is as follows: 1) Our benchmark economy is successfully calibrated to match aggregate statistics regarding fertility, employment, and wages. 2) The model implies important differences in labor market turnover by males and females, with long lasting effects in employment and wages. 3) The model is able to account for almost all the wage gap between males and females that is attributed to labor market experience in the empirical literature. 4) The model implies a very small role of tenure capital in accounting for wage differences between males and females and between females with and without children. The intuition for this last result is simple. Females deciding to have children and willing to break a match are likely self-selected from those with low specific human capital.
Selection reduces the extent of losses associated with fertility and labor turnover. This result contradicts the hypothesis that losses of specific capital, due to career interruptions, are responsible for the observed wage gap between women with and without children (Waldfogel, 1998b ). Phipps, Burton, and Lethbridge (2001) present independent evidence that strongly supports this result.
The empirical literature on female labor supply and wages is quite extensive (for a survey see Killingsworth and Heckman, 1999) . Some of these studies have focused on the effects of career interruptions in female wages (Mincer and Ofek, 1982; Cox, 1984; and Light and Ureta, 1995) . Researchers have found a link between fertility induced withdrawals from the labor force and lower female wages (Gronau, 1988 and Korenman and Neumark, 1992) .
Moreover, theory and evidence support the idea that fertility, wages, and labor supply are simultaneously determined, as emphasized by Angrist and Evans (1998 of these papers deal with marriage issues in the labor market and abstract from fertility and labor market decisions. We abstract from marriage issues but concentrate on the interaction of fertility and labor market decisions.
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Our analysis proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the economic environment. Section 3 describes the calibration of our benchmark economy to U.S. data. In section 4 we report the main implications of the benchmark economy. This section includes a version of the model where fertility and labor market decisions are exogenous to worker's 1 There is some evidence that marital status does not change the child penalties in wages for women, while it generates a large premium in wages for males, Phipps, Burton, and Lethbridge (2001).
characteristics. Section 5 presents a sensitivity analysis with respect to the exogenous component of labor mobility in our economy and show that our results are robust to changes in this dimension. Finally, we conclude with some directions for future research.
Economic Environment
We develop an environment to study permanent separations between a worker and a job due to fertility, and its impact on human capital accumulation. To this end, we consider a search theoretic framework and incorporate male and female workers, on-the-job human capital accumulation, and fertility decisions. We study the impact of fertility and labor market decisions on human capital accumulated on the job. Since the paper focuses on steady state equilibria, aggregate variables are not indexed by time. Below, we describe the environment in detail.
Demographics and Preferences
The economy is populated by a large number of adults that face exponential life: every period there is a constant probability ρ of dying. We assume there is an equal proportion of males and females. Females can have children when fertile, but face a constant probability φ of becoming non-fertile every period.
Individuals derive utility from consumption. In addition, females also derive utility from the number of children and from the time spent with children. The instantaneous utility function is linear in consumption of goods and time with children, and concave with respect to the number of children.
The utility value of spending time with children is stochastic. Each period a fertile female draws a value v from a time invariant distribution with cdf F (v). The inter-temporal discount factor is β. We denote by β = β(1 − ρ) the effective discount factor, where (1 − ρ) is the survival probability.
Technologies:
• Human Capital Individuals are endowed with one unit of productive time each period and do not value leisure. Individuals differ in the amount of productive labor services per unit of time supplied to the market, object that we call human capital h. There are two components to human capital: general learning-by-doing (experience) and specific learning-by-doing (tenure). We assume that human capital evolves stochastically depending upon labor market decisions. In particular, when a worker separates from a job, all specific human capital is lost but general human capital remains constant.
When an individual works, both tenure and experience capital may increase by one unit with probability π a .
• Job Quality and Upgrade Opportunities We assume that jobs can be of different qualities q. When individuals with human capital h work, they face with probability θ(h) the opportunity of making a job to job transition at the end of the period. If individuals decide to change jobs, their job quality increases by one unit and their tenure capital is lost. In this way the model economy captures an important feature of the U.S. labor market: job-to-job transitions are quite frequent among young workers and are associated with substantial wage growth.
• Output In each period, there is only one good produced in this economy, and the production technology requires one worker that generates output as an increasing function of human capital and job quality y(h, q).
• Search The flow of workers from non-employment to employment in our model is exogenous: with probability p a non-employed worker finds a job opportunity.
• Job Destruction Jobs are destroyed every period at the rate λ(h) that depends on individual's human capital. There is a large literature documenting how job to non-employment mobility depends on experience and tenure of the worker, see for example Farber (1999) , Anderson and Mayer (1992) , and Topel and Ward (1992) .
an employed worker continues with the current employment opportunity in the following period.
The Problem of a Fertile-Female We assume that fertile females take decisions in three stages within a period. First, females decide whether to give birth or not. Second, females with employment opportunities decide whether to work or not. Third, females that worked in the second stage face with probability θ the opportunity to upgrade job quality by changing jobs (job-to-job mobility).
At the beginning of a period a fertile female receives a utility value v of spending time with children during this period. She can only enjoy this value if she gives birth in the current period or if she gave birth some time before but has not returned to work since then.
We find it convenient to use a state variable d ∈ {0, 1} (denoting domestic status) in the We represent the timing of decisions and shocks for a fertile female within a period in the following diagram: an employment opportunity, they decide whether to work or not. In the third stage, the demographic shock, the human capital shock, the job destruction shock, and the job mobility opportunity shock are realized. Individuals die with probability ρ, and conditional on being alive, might become non-fertile with probability φ. When a female becomes non-fertile, her children become adults and enter the labor market. probability λ(h) the job is destroyed and the worker must wait for a new job to arrive, with probability θ(h) a worker has the opportunity to move to a job with higher quality. With
the worker keeps the current employment opportunity in the following period. Conditional on working this period, and having a moving opportunity, a mobility decision is made in the third stage.
At the beginning of the first stage fertile females make fertility decisions. We denote by V the value function after fertility decisions are made. The fertility decision problem can be represented as,
where the subscript j ∈ {o, no} indicates job status (offer and no offer respectively), the superscript f denotes a fertile female, and b(d, q, h, n, v) ∈ {0, 1} is the optimal policy rule from this problem. Note that fertility decisions are made after the fertility shock is realized.
We denote W as the value function before the fertility shock is known,
A fertile female that has an employment opportunity (j = o) decides whether to accept it (A) or reject it (R). We represent the labor market decision problem as follows,
The value of accepting an employment opportunity A is given by,
The first two terms represent the current period utility which is given by the wage rate and the utility of children. Conditional on being alive next period, the expected value for the female next period depends on whether she remains fertile (probability 1 − φ), on whether the job is not destroyed (probability 1−λ−θ), on the evolution of human capital (probability π a hh ), and on the job mobility opportunity (probability θ). These in turn depend on human capital and labor market decisions. The value of a moving opportunity is given by,
Note that if the worker moves, job quality increases by one unit but all tenure capital is lost.
If the worker stays, experience and tenure evolve according to the accepting probabilities for working individuals. Also note that since moving opportunities only occur when working, domestic status is always d 0 .
The value of rejecting an employment opportunity R is given by,
If a female stays at home, she receives current utility vd, labor income is zero, and human capital becomes h r (h). Conditional on being alive, next period there is a probability p of receiving an employment opportunity.
A fertile female without an employment opportunity does not make any decisions in the second stage and her value coincides with the value of rejecting an employment opportunity,
The Problem of a Non-Fertile Female and a Male We assume that when a fertile female becomes non-fertile, her children leave home and become adults, and therefore she no longer derives utility from spending time at home. Therefore, at the beginning of the period, the state of a non-fertile female includes job status, job quality, human capital, and number of children. Clearly, non-fertile females only make labor market decisions.
A non-fertile female with an employment opportunity decides whether to accept or reject it, therefore,
where the value of accepting and rejecting are simpler versions of the values for fertile females.
A non-fertile female without an employment opportunity does not make any decision and therefore the value of not having an employment opportunity (no) is the same as the value of rejecting it,
At the beginning of the period, a male has job status and human capital as state variables.
Therefore the male problem in our environment is equivalent to the one of a non-fertile female with no children (except for the fact that non-fertile females have a lower expected lifetime than males).
The individuals' optimal decision rules and the stochastic processes for demographic, human capital, and labor market shocks imply an invariant distribution of states across individuals. Fertility decisions and the demographic shocks determine the population growth rate and the fraction of males, fertile and non-fertile females in the population.
Calibration of Benchmark Economy
The Family and Medical Leave Act (F.M.L.A.) instituting three months of unpaid maternity leave was approved by the U.S. Congress in 1993. Because we do not model parental leave policies, we calibrate our Benchmark economy to U.S. data prior to 1993. Whenever possible we use data for 1988 that are less likely to be affected by changes in behavior due to the expectation of the passage of the F.M.L.A. The objective of our calibration procedure is to make the equilibrium of the model consistent with observations relevant for the purpose of our research question, that is, consistent with employment levels of males and females, human capital accumulation, wage differences, and fertility rates. As it stands, however, the model cannot reproduce the observations along all of these dimensions. For this reason, we introduce two additional features into the model economy. First, in order to generate a reasonable distribution of number of children across women and a reasonable age of motherhood, we assume that females cannot have children in every period of their fertile lifetime.
Second, in order to generate plausible gender and family wage gaps, we introduce exogenous gender and family productivity gaps. Below, we explain our calibration procedure and the role of the two model features just described.
Time and Demographic Parameters
The length of the model period is inversely related to the computational cost of our model economy. Since our calibration exercise involves solving 6 equations in 6 unknowns, choosing the length of the period is a non-trivial issue. We choose a model period of one quarter. By choosing a model period of a quarter and assuming that the value of staying at home is drawn each period from an iid distribution over time, we obtain some "persistence" in the value of staying at home at a low computational cost. The time preference parameter β is selected to match an annual interest rate of 4%.
The probability of dying in a period ρ is selected to reproduce a working life expectancy of 45 years. Similarly, the probability of becoming non-fertile is selected to reproduce an expected fertile life of 20 years. Time Cost of Children We assume that each child reduces by a fraction τ the hours worked by employed fertile females. Though there is substantial evidence about the negative effect of children on hours worked by women, the endogeneity of fertility decisions make it hard to assess the magnitude of this effect. Using an instrumental variable approach based on the sibling sex mix in families with two or more children, Angrist and Evans (1998) find that working women reduce hours worked by 4.6 hours a week per child, which is about 10% of the hours worked by full time workers. We thus set τ = .10.
Labor Productivity: Experience, Tenure, and Job Quality In our model economy, labor productivity depends on three factors: (a) general experience, which accumulates with time working; (b) specific tenure, which accumulates with time working within a job; (c) job quality, which accumulates by shopping for jobs in the labor market. In particular, the labor productivity of a male worker with general human capital g, specific capital s, and job quality q is given by
where h q (q), h g (g), h s (s) represent, respectively, the cumulative increase in productivity due to job quality q, experience g, and tenure s. The initial levels of human capital are all normalized to one.
We use estimates from Topel (1991) in order to select values for general (experience) and specific (tenure) human capital. We assume that human capital increases with experience and tenure at the same rate across genders. For ease of computation, experience and tenure are restricted to take values in the set {0, 1, ..., 14} expressed in years (i.e. only multiples of a year are allowed) and evolve stochastically over time as follows: We assume that there are 10 job quality types and that the increase in labor productivity due to job quality can be expressed as follows, h q (q) = 1 + ξq, for q = 1, ..., 10 and ξ > 0. Topel and Ward (1992) report that for young workers in their first ten years of labor market experience, in average, a job-to-job transition is associated with a 10% increase in wages. Therefore, we select ξ = 0.10. We assume that when a worker undergoes a job-to-job transition, the quality of a job q increases by one unit and when an employed worker with job quality q enters a spell of non-employment, job quality remains the same. This assumption is supported by the evidence in Topel (1990) and Farber (1993) .
Female Workers: Exogenous Productivity Gaps The model features fertility and labor market decisions to generate differences in human capital accumulation across gender and family (motherhood) status. The model abstracts from other relevant features that might be important in accounting for gender and family wage differences (such as the possibility that mothers exsert less effort when working (Becker, 1985) , discrimination in hiring, promotion, and the allocation of firm-provided training, among others). Therefore, we assume that females's labor productivity is ω g points lower than the labor productivity of a male with the same experience and tenure. In addition, we assume that the labor productivity of mothers is reduced by ω f points per child. As a result, labor productivity of a female with n children, quality of a job q, general human capital g, and specific capital s is equal to,
where h q (e), h g (g), h s (s) are the functions defined for male workers. The parameters (ω g , w f ) are calibrated to match the family and gender wage gap in the U.S. economy. Blau and Kahn (2000) report a gender wage gap of 19.5% when adjusting for age, education, and experience differences between individuals in the sample (the un-adjusted gap is 27.6%). Waldfogel (1998a, 1998b) reports that, after controlling for age, education, experience, year, and individual fixed effects, on average, a child reduces women's wages in 4.6%. We emphasize that in our model these gaps can have important consequences for fertility and labor market behavior, so it is crucial that the model is consistent with these observations. Fertility Opportunities We assume that females face a stochastic shock representing a fertility opportunity, determining whether they can consider having a child or not. A model without fertility opportunities would imply that a large number of non-employed females have children, most of them one immediately after the other, which would be inconsistent with biological time required between births. Fertility opportunities make the model roughly consistent with the average age of mothers at first and second birth, and the distribution of number of children across women.
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These observations are relevant for two reasons: First, the age at which females give birth in our model is likely to be related with tenure on the job and, thus, with the specific human capital that the female would loose if quitting the job. Second, the number of children in our model is a crucial determinant of women's labor market behavior.
We introduce fertility opportunities, as a vector σ, where σ(i) represents the probability that a fertile female can have the i-th child. Then, the value function W in equation (1) takes the following form,
We restrict the number of children a female can have to the set {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, however, we don't think this is a severe restriction since the fraction of women with more than six children in the data is less than 0.3%. We select the values of the vector σ so that the first three components are equal to 0.05 and the last three components are equal to 0.025. Topel and Ward (1992) report data on the percentage of male workers separating from a job disaggregated by type of transition:
Job Mobility and Exogenous Separations
job-to-job and job-to-non-employment. Furthermore, these hazard rates are disaggregated by experience at start of the job and tenure at the end of the job (see Topel and Ward, Table   V , page 454). Because males in our benchmark economy do not reject jobs and always choose to change jobs if a mobility opportunity arises, both job-to-job and job-to-non employment transitions for males should match our constructed mobility matrices from Topel and Ward (1992) . Tables 1 and 2 report these statistics. Therefore, θ(h) and λ(h) are calibrated to match these statistics. 
Calibration of Other Parameters
We have yet to specify the values of 6 parameters: the probability of finding a job p, the preference parameter for number of children γ n , the mean and standard deviation of fertility-home shock (µ v , σ v ), and the exogenous gender and family wage gaps (ω g , ω f ). These parameter values are chosen so that the equilibrium of the model reproduces the following 6 targets: employment to population ratio of males, aggregate fertility rate, employment to population ratio of mothers with infants (less than one year old children), employment to population ratio of fertile females, gender wage gap, and family wage gap. As a result, our calibration procedure involves solving numerically a system of 6 equations in 6 unknowns! Discussion of Data Targets A short remark on the choice of some of the data targets is worth making. First, given the exogenous job separation rates for males λ(h), the employment level of males is mainly determined by the probability of finding a job p. The employment to population ratio of males is 86% for workers 20 to 64 years of age as documented by the U.S. Census Bureau for 1988. 6 Second, because there is an important time trend in employment of women, aggregate employment to population ratios of working-age women tend to be lower than that of women of recent cohorts. Because our model abstracts from this time trend, we choose a target of employment for younger women that is less subject to this time bias. We obtain from the U.S. Census Bureau the employment to population ratio of females 25 to 44 years of age, calculated to be 66%. We interpret this target as the employment of fertile females. Third, we emphasize the importance of matching female labor 6 It turns out that the calibrated value for p is 0.22, which implies an average duration of non-employment of 54 weeks. The average duration of unemployment in the U.S. economy was 14 weeks in 1988 as reported by the Economic Report of the President. Whether this difference can be explained by the duration of individuals out of the labor force is subject to debate. Though not reported in this paper, we have checked the sensitivity of our results by calibrating our economy with a target of p = 0.67 (in order to match average duration of unemployment in the U.S.). The gender wage differences were almost the same as in our Benchmark economy. turnover associated with childbirth by considering the labor market behavior of women after childbirth. To this end, we use the employment to population ratio of mothers with infants (less than one year old children) as a target. Klerman and Leibowitz (1994) report labor market statistics from the Current Population Survey and supplements for recent mothers.
They report an employment to population ratio of mothers with infants of 45%.
In calibrating our model economy, the value of some parameters can be chosen with no need to solve the model. The value of these parameters are reported in Table 3 . The calibration of the other parameters involves solving the model economy and their values are reported in Table 4 . Table 2 ξ -wage gain with job-to-job mobility 0.10 τ -time cost per child 0.10 Fertility opportunities:
0.025 
Properties of the Benchmark Economy
In this section we show that the calibrated economy is consistent with U.S. data on fertility rates, employment to population ratios, and wage gaps. We argue that, as a first step, our paper is quite successful in building a quantitative theory of labor market and fertility decisions in the U.S. economy. We use our quantitative framework in order to study how fertility decisions affect females's labor market outcomes. To this end, we compare labor market statistics across genders. Since in our benchmark economy females with no children have exactly the same decision rules as males, gender differences in employment rates, turnover behavior, and human capital accumulation can be attributed to females's fertility decisions. Our findings document the close interaction of fertility and labor market decisions in our model economy and illustrate the importance of jointly modelling these decisions. Table 5 compares the results of our benchmark economy with U.S. data along the targets specified in the calibration section. The model matches very closely the targets for male and female employment, fertility, and wage gaps. In particular, the model matches almost exactly the targets for employment to population ratios of fertile females and mothers with infants (mothers with less than a year-old child). Fertility has an important impact on female's employment, both in our model and in the data. In the model, while 68% of fertile females are employed, the employment to population ratio of mothers with infants is only 44%. These observations suggest that the model economy is generating plausible amounts of labor market turnover due to fertility decisions. Table 5 reports (hourly) wage gaps in our benchmark economy. Notice that the family and gender wage gaps reproduce the targets from the data: in our benchmark economy, females present, on average, an hourly wage that is 19.6% lower than that of a male with the same age and experience; and females with children have, on average, 11.3% lower wage than females without children with the same age and experience. It is convenient to explain how we compute these statistics. We compute gender wage gaps as one minus the ratio of females's wages to males's wages. In measuring wage ratios, we follow the empirical literature in controlling for differences in age and experience across workers. To this end, we compute a wage ratio for each possible experience and age category and then use the joint distribution of age and experience to aggregate the wage ratios across workers. In this way, our statistics are readily comparable with the ones in the empirical literature (see, for instance, Blau and Kahn, 2000, 1997). We compute the family gap as one minus the ratio of wages of females with children to the wages of females without children. Again, we compute wage ratios for all age and experience categories and use the appropriate distributions in order to obtain an aggregate family wage ratio.
Calibration Results

Fertility and Labor Market Turnover Fertility decisions have an important and long lasting impact on females's labor market turnover. When females matched with a job
give birth, they are quite likely to separate from their job: among these females, 62% work and 38% separates from the job. Because turnover probabilities in our benchmark economy depend on tenure (see Tables 1 and 2) , and because workers loose all their tenure capital with a job separation, a job separation today increases the likelihood of a job separation in the subsequent job. As a result, job separations due to fertility decisions affect future labor market turnover and have a long lasting effect on females's employment.
Employment by Sex and Age Fertility behavior generates large differences in employment rates across genders.
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When individuals enter the labor market (e.g., at age-20), employment rates are quite similar across genders. As individuals age, they are matched with jobs and their chances of being employed rises substantially, regardless of their gender (see Figure 1) . Because a significant fraction of females interrupt their career as they become older and give birth, the female employment rate increases with age at a much slower pace than the male employment rate. In our economy, females give birth, on average, to 2.15 children, with the first and second child being born when the mother is, on average, 23.8 and 27.8, years of age respectively. By age 30, the female employment rate is about 14 percentage points lower than the male employment rate. Large gender differences in employment rates are still observed by age 45. These patterns of employment by age and sex follow closely the observed patterns in U.S. data. Table 6 reports the employment to population ratios for males and females by age categories in 1988 from the U.S. data (OECD, 1998). Employment increases by age for both men and women, but the gap widens as individuals age. 
Job to Non-Employment and Job to Job Flows by Age and Sex
We denote the fraction of individuals that move from a job into non-employment within a year, as the annual job to non-employment mobility rate. Figure 2 documents this statistic by sex and age. As it could be expected from Table 2 , the figure shows that job to non-employment rates are quite high when individuals enter the labor market and decrease with age at a rapid pace as individuals accumulate tenure and experience in their jobs. More interestingly, the probability of moving into non-employment is much higher for females than for males (38% for males and 42% for females in their first year of labor market experience, and decreases to around 7% by age 45). At the root of this finding is the interaction of two forces: First, a significant fraction of females move from a job into non-employment when they give birth.
Second, career interruptions caused by fertility decisions lead females to accumulate less tenure and experience than the average male of similar age. Because exogenous separations were calibrated to be negatively correlated with experience and tenure on the job, a female worker that has interrupted her career in the recent past faces a higher probability of being separated from her job than the average male of the same age. As a result, fertility decisions affect females's job to non-employment flows long after these decisions have taken place.
In a similar vein, we denote the fraction of individuals that move from a job into another job as the job-to-job mobility rate. Figure 3 presents the annual job to job mobility rate by age and sex. Job to job mobility rates follow an inverted U-shape as a function of age and tend to be quite similar across genders.
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Even though the job to job mobility rates in Table   1 are not monotone in experience and/or tenure, they tend to be increasing with experience (for fixed tenure) and decreasing with tenure (with and without holding experience constant).
As a result, there are two opposing forces determining the age-profile of job to job mobility rates. First, because during the first few years in the labor market average experience of individuals tend to raise more rapidly with age than average tenure, job to job mobility rates increase with age at the beginning of the career of a typical worker. Second, because the job to non-employment mobility rates decrease substantially with experience, average tenure on the job increases significantly with age when the worker is close to being 30 years old. This increase in tenure, in turn, leads to a decreasing relationship of job to job mobility rates with age. Thus, the parameterization of job to job and job to non-employment mobility rates, together with the way experience and tenure accumulate with age, lead to the inverted U-shape relationship in Figure 3 .
A comparison of Figures 2 and 3 reveals that gender differences in job to non-employment rates are much more important that gender differences in job to job rates. These observations reflect the fact that, in our model, both males and females accept all job mobility opportunities, but females are more likely to move into non-employment than males for fertility reasons. Even though job to job mobility decisions do not differ across genders, when individuals are young, job to job mobility rates are slightly lower for females than for males.
The reason is that job to non-employment rates are substantially larger for young females than for young males. When individuals are 35 years of age or older, job to job mobility rates are slightly larger for females than for males. This occurs because gender differences in job to non-employment rates decrease substantially with age (as experience is accumulated) and females have, on average, more job changing opportunities than males as a result of their lower tenure on the job.
Unfortunately, Topel and Ward (1992) do not report turnover rates by age so that we cannot compare our Figures 2 and 3 with the data. They do report, however, quarterly hazard rates for job mobility (defined as the sum of job to job and job to non-employment flows) by job tenure, for males between 18 and 34 years of age. They find that job mobility decreases quite fast with tenure: the quarterly job mobility rate can be as high as 25% within the first year in a job and around 6% after 5 years in a job. Figure 5 presents quarterly job mobility rates by tenure and sex in our benchmark economy, for individuals between 20 and 34 years of age. As in the Topel and Ward data, job mobility rates in our model are quite high at low levels of tenure, more than 20% per quarter within the first year on the job, and fall quite fast as tenure accumulates, stabilizing around 7% per quarter after 4 or more years of tenure. The benchmark economy is thus quite successful in reproducing
Topel and Ward's data on job mobility by tenure. Because turnover probabilities depend on tenure and experience, the previous discussion suggests that our benchmark economy generates joint experience and tenure profiles consistent with the data.
Average Wages by Age and Sex The gender differences in labor market turnover have important consequences for human capital accumulation. Figure 4 presents the ageprofile of average wages for male and female workers. Male and female workers enter the labor market with the lowest possible levels of experience, tenure, and job quality. Female workers, however, were assumed to be less productive than males by an amount ω g , which is calibrated to 12%. Figure 4 shows that gender differences in labor productivity are amplified quite significantly with worker's age. With age, females are increasingly likely to have gone through a fertility-related career interruption and, consequently, tenure and experience would be, on average, lower than that of males. Moreover, as the number of children increase for a given female, her productivity decreases by a fraction ω f per child (that is calibrated to 4.6%). A fourth factor leading to a low female wage, is that females are employed in jobs of lower quality than males. To understand this observation, it is important to keep in mind that females are much less likely to be employed than males (see, again, Figure 1 ). They are thus less likely to increase their job quality than males as they age, even if job to job mobility rates are similar across genders. To sum up, the effects of career interruptions in tenure, experience, job quality, and family wage gap lead to a low female to male wage ratio.
Since the fraction of females that have gone through a career interruption increases with age, gender wage differences grow with workers's age. This property of the model is found in the data. Table 7 reports mean earnings of full-time year-round workers by age groups and sex in 1988 from the U.S. Census Bureau. Earnings grow with age and the difference between males and females expands as workers age. The benchmark economy is consistent with these observations. In fact, in Table 8 we report mean earnings for three age groups in our benchmark economy and the figures obtained are remarkably close to the ones reported for the U.S. economy (compare Tables 7 and 8 ). , we consider two types of gender wage ratios: (i) a raw gender wage ratio, which is computed as the ratio of average wages of females to average wages of males and (ii) an experience gender wage ratio, which controls for differences in age and experience across genders.
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Blau and Kahn (1997, 2000) report a raw gender wage ratio of 0.724 and a experience gender wage ratio of 0.805 for the U.S. economy in 1988. The difference between the two ratios is interpreted by these authors as the contribution of gender differences in experience to gender wage inequality. Table 9 shows that the Benchmark economy matches quite closely the two ratios reported by Blau and Kahn. While the Benchmark economy was calibrated to reproduce the experience wage ratio, it should be emphasized that the raw gender wage ratio was not a target of our calibration. It is a remarkable finding that, in our Benchmark economy, the impact 9 Notice that the first age group in Tables 7 and 8 are not exactly the same, in the model the youngest individuals are 20 years old, instead of 18 in the data.
10 See the paragraph Calibration Results above for an explanation on how we compute experience wage gaps.
of fertility decisions on labor market turnover accounts for almost all the gender wage differentials that are attributed to labor market experience in the U.S. economy by Kahn (1997, 2000) . In our benchmark economy, a significant fraction of females separate from their jobs due to child birth and, as a result, they not only loose their tenure capital but also accumulate less experience than males. These effects persist over time because turnover probabilities depend on tenure and experience. When females return to work, they are thus more likely to be separated from a job and less likely to upgrade their job qualities than males of the same age. The impact of career interruptions on tenure, experience, and quality of jobs, reduce the female wage rate by an amount equal to 7.6% of the average male wage, which is close to the 8.1% figure reported by Kahn (1997, 2000) . In the benchmark economy, females are less productive than males of the same age and experience for four reasons: (i) the exogenous gender productivity gap ω g ; (ii) the exogenous per-child family gap of ω f ; (iii) the lower average accumulation of specific capital (tenure);
and (iv) the lower accumulation of job quality capital. We can thus use our model to answer the following question: What is the role of specific human capital and job quality in accounting for the gender and family wage gaps? The answer is that tenure capital and job quality play a minor role in accounting for the gaps. To illustrate this point, we decompose the wage gap into the different features that contribute to the gaps: exogenous components (ω g ,ω f ), tenure, and job quality. Table 10 shows that the wage gaps in the benchmark economy are mostly accounted for by the exogenous components of the gap. In particular, differences in specific capital and quality account for only 2.8% of the gender wage gap and 7.3% of the family gap.
This result contradicts the hypothesis that losses of tenure capital (due to job separations)
are responsible for the observed wage gap between women with children and without children (see Waldfogel, 1998b , and the references therein). The small role of tenure capital in accounting for wage gaps is due to a selection mechanism: since labor market and fertility job quality is highly correlated with labor market experience, job quality has a small role in accounting for wage gaps (once differences in experience are controlled for!). As a result, wage differentials that are not accounted for by differences in experience are mostly driven by the exogenous productivity parameters in the model (ω g , ω f ).
Phipps, Burton, and Lethbridge (2001) present evidence supporting our finding that specific capital does not play an important role in accounting for the family wage gap.
Estimating wage equations with Canadian data, they find that having a child is associated with an average reduction in wages of 13%, but that the "child penalty" for women with time out of work on parental leave is only reduced in 3 percentage points. Their findings thus indicate that specific capital does not play an important role in explaining child penalties in wages.
Evaluating the Importance of the Selection Mechanism: An Economy with Exogenous Decisions We have conjectured that in our benchmark economy females that interrupt their careers when giving birth are self-selected from those with low tenure on their jobs and, as a result, career interruptions do not lead to important losses of specific capital. In order to evaluate this possibility, we compare the wage gaps in our benchmark economy with those of an economy where females's decisions are exogenous as follows: (a)
when faced with a fertility opportunity, females give birth with probability probirth; (b) when giving birth, females reject employment opportunities with probability probreject; and (c) when facing a job mobility opportunity, females change jobs with probability 1. Males make optimal labor market decisions which, in our parameterization of the model economy means that males always decide to work when faced with an employment opportunity and change jobs when faced with a job mobility opportunity. The parameters probirth and probreject are chosen so that the economy with exogenous decisions replicates a fertility rate of 2.1 and an employment ratio of females of 0.66.
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The findings do indicate the presence of a selection mechanism: the gender and family wage gaps are higher in the economy with exogenous decisions than in the benchmark economy by 7.1% and 28.6%, respectively. When decisions to give birth and separate from a job are random, that is, independent of the costs of job separation, female mothers suffer large human capital losses, even after controlling for differences in experience.
Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we study the sensitivity of our results to the parameterization of the turnover probabilities (λ, θ). Turnover probabilities play an important role in determining employment opportunities and human capital accumulation in our model economy. As a result, they may determine the importance of fertility decisions in accounting for gender differences in employment and wages. In our benchmark economy, we use data from Topel and Ward (1992) in order to calibrate job to job mobility opportunities and job to non-employment rates. Unfortunately, Royalty (1998) reports empirical turnover rates that are quite different from the ones found by Topel and Ward.
In this section, we calibrate our model economy so that job mobility rates for males are consistent with the job turnover data reported by Royalty. As in our benchmark economy, we find that fertility decisions can generate large gender differences in employment and 11 In the benchmark calibration, the exogenous rates needed to match the targets imply a probirth of 78.8% and a probreject of 63.6%. These exogenous rates imply a fertility rate of 2.16 and an employment ratio of females of 67.4%. The benchmark calibration with endogenous decisions generates a fertility rate of 2.15 and an employment ratio of females of 67.7%.
wages, and that career interruptions due to child birth can account for the contribution of experience to the raw gender wage gap found by Blau and Kahn. Furthermore, tenure and job quality play a small role in accounting for gender wage differences once age and experience are controlled for. Again, the endogeneity of fertility and labor market decisions imply that child birth causes small losses of specific capital.
Calibration We calibrate the model economy to the same targets as in the Benchmark economy except that we consider a different process for job to job and job to non-employment mobility. Our goal is to construct a model economy that reproduces the statistics on labor market turnover reported by Royalty together with the calibration targets used to parameterize the Benchmark economy. The resulting economy is denoted as "Royalty economy".
Parameter values for this economy are summarized in Table 3 (except for the values of θ and λ) and in Table 12 . The exogenous turnover probabilities (θ, λ) are calibrated as follows:
job to non-employment rates λ are calibrated to be 70% the rates estimated by Topel and Ward for every experience and tenure level, that is, job to non-employment rates of males are 70% the numbers reported in Table 2 . Job to job mobility rates are assumed as in Table   13 . 
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Recall that the Royalty economy is calibrated to match the job mobility rates for males by tenure and experience, therefore it is not surprising that the model is able to capture the job mobility rates of males by age. Note however that the Benchmark mobility rates (calibrated to Topel and Ward) for males are substantially above the rates implied by Royalty's data. Figure 6 shows that the difference in job to non-employment rates between males and females both in the Benchmark and Royalty economies are not far from the data. This result indicates that fertility decisions account for the gender differences in job to non-employment turnover observed in the U.S. Figure 7 shows that the gender differences in job to job mobility rates in the model economy are smaller than in the data. The model successfully reproduces the data for males but not for females. In particular, job to job turnover rates by females in the model economy are too large relative to the data at every age. This observation suggests 12 The turnover data reported by Royalty (1998) features lower job mobility rates than the data used by Topel and Ward (1992) . We think that there are many potential factors that may account for these differences: First, Topel and Ward use data from administrative records, while Royalty uses self-reported records from the NLSY that include up to 5 job changes in any given year. Second, Topel that other factors such as joint location decisions and flexible schedules may account for the actual lower job to job mobility of females. It also indicates that our model economy may under-estimate the true gender differences in job quality. Understanding the observed gender differences in job to job turnover is thus an interesting subject for future research.
Employment and Wages by Age and Sex Because the Royalty economy and the Benchmark economy are calibrated to the same targets of employment, the two economies have very similar age-profile of employment ratios (despite the differences in the parameterization of the turnover probabilities). Figure 8 compares the age-profile of wages across the two economies. As individuals become older, average wages grow less in the Royalty economy than in the Benchmark economy, both for males and females. This observation is explained by the low average job quality in the Royalty economy relative to the Benchmark economy, which, in turn, is due to the (relatively) low job to job mobility rates in the Royalty economy.
Wage Gaps Despite the differences in the parameterization of the turnover probabilities, Table 15 shows that the raw gender wage ratios are quite similar across the two economies. The impact of fertility decisions on tenure, experience, and quality of jobs, reduce the female average wage by 8.6 percentage points in the Royalty economy, which is quite close to the 7.6 figure previously reported for the Benchmark economy and the 8.1 figure reported by Blau and Khan (2000) . However, once gender differences in experience and age are controlled for, wage gaps are mostly accounted for by the exogenous components (ω g ,ω f ). That is, specific human capital and job quality play a minor role in accounting for gender and family wage gaps (see Table 16 ). The small effect of tenure capital is, as in the Benchmark economy, due to a selection mechanism: females that have children and separate from their jobs are likely to be self-selected from the group of females with low tenure capital. In order to assess the importance of this selection mechanism, we consider an experiment similar to the one performed in our benchmark economy. As in the previous section, we consider an economy with exogenous fertility and labor market decisions but with the turnover probabilities of the Royalty economy. Again, these decisions are parameterized so that the economy replicates the fertility rate and the employment ratio of females of the economy with endogenous decisions (e.g. Royalty economy). Table 17 shows that selection 13 The exogenous decisions are parameterized as in the experiment performed when analyzing the selection effect in the Benchmark economy. The parameters probirth and probreject (which are defined in the previous is also important in the Royalty economy: the gender and family wage gaps are higher when decisions are exogenous by 8.3% and 36.2%, respectively. 
Conclusions
This paper builds a quantitative framework of labor market and fertility decisions that is quite successful in replicating the U.S. data regarding employment, wages, and fertility rates.
We find that fertility decisions generate important gender differences in turnover rates, with section) are set to 0.74 and 0.62, respectively, in order to replicate a target of 2.1 for the fertility rate and 0.66 for the employment ratio of fertile females.
long lasting effects in employment and wages. These differences in labor turnover account for almost all the U.S. gender wage gap that is attributed to labor market experience by Blau and Kahn (2000) . The model also implies a very small role of tenure capital in accounting for wage differences between males and females (gender gap) and between females with and without children (family gap). This result contradicts the hypothesis that losses of specific capital, due to career interruptions, are responsible for the observed wage gap between women with and without children (Waldfogel, 1998b) .
Our model can be extended in order to endogeneize the demand side of the labor market, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) . In such a framework, gender differences in wages could be larger than gender differences in labor productivity. The idea is that if the fixed costs of a job position are non-negligible, then wages can be significantly below labor productivity.
Furthermore, this wedge is likely to increase with the rate of job separations. If as the empirical evidence indicates, job separations are decreasing with tenure, the ratio of wages to labor productivity would increase with job tenure. Thus, the gender and family wage gaps could be amplified if mothers have low tenure.
In the framework just discussed, workers and entrepreneurs may agree to temporarily separate so that women would not face costly career interruptions when giving birth. If 
